I did honours in computer science in 2007, under the supervision of Dr Tasos Viglas at the School of Information Technologies at the University of Sydney.


In a network, greedy, independent agents aim to minimise their own personal cost (such as travel time between source and destination) without regard to wider, societal impacts of their behaviour. The inefficiency due to this behaviour can be studied through such measures as the price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the cost of the worst-case Nash equilibrium to that of the optimal flow. One application of this game theoretic analysis is in allowing network operators to charge users equitably and profitably for multicast traffic sent through their networks, because multicast traffic along a link cannot be simply attributed to one particular user. The aim of the project is to extend and modify existing models of multicast pricing, to improve the resultant societal cost even with greedy, independent agents and their applicability to real-world multicast uses. Theoretical properties, such as time and network overhead complexity, will be examined to determine the tractability of the models.


For INFO4990 (IT Research Methods) course